Selfie: User-defined Sensitive Memory Protection and Recovery by Sun, Pengfei & Zonouz, Saman
Selfie: User-defined Sensitive Memory Protection
and Recovery
Pengfei Sun
Rutgers University
pengfei.sun@rutgers.edu
Saman Zonouz
Rutgers University
saman.zonouz@rutgers.edu
Abstract—Different users always have different requirement
for sensitive memory definition. It is not flexible for aborting
program execution once detecting memory corruption. Because
the users may loose some sensitive data. We presented Selfie, a
hybrid solution to provide one flexible solution to protect the
sensitive memory according to users’ requirements in runtime.
Finally, Selfie can provide one solution to decide whether exe-
cution needs to be recovered. If the memory corruption doesn’t
belong sensitive memory, Selfie provides symbolic solver that can
help figure out whether the memory corruption can affect the
sensitive memory in future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many programs are still written using type-unsafe lan-
guages such as C and C++ for performance and compatibility
reasons. However, these languages don’t provide intrinsic
guarantees about memory safety [1], [2], [3]. Lack of memory
safety, in turn, forms the basis for attacks in the form of
code injection [4] and code reuse [5]. Once memory errors
happen, the interesting sensitive memory need to keep integrity
and recovery from users view. Most time, memory corruption
can damage the memory integrity. Memory corruption occurs
when a program breaks type safety and writes to an unintended
location, potentially corrupting the data. Because all memory
locations are equally accessible to all store instructions in a
program, current approaches to providing safety from memory
corruption in C and C++ require that every store in a program
be either statically or dynamically checked for correctness.
That means it will incur source code or binary code modifi-
cation. As a result, there are significant challenges to existing
approaches that limit their practical application.
Assuming the source code is available, it is not easy for
developers to define sensitive memory for users. Because dif-
ferent users always have different views for sensitive memory.
Especially, if the developer makes too much protection which
will increase the performance overhead. Meanwhile, most of
time, it is impossible for users to get the source code of
commercial software. So it is not practical to custom the
sensitive memory protection. Even if there are good solution
to define the sensitive memory for different users, the another
challenge will be how to detect the memory corruptions and
recognize whether the memory corruptions will affect the
sensitive memory and whether the clean state before memory
corruptions need to be recovered. There already are many
solutions about how to detect memory corruptions. A number
of approaches that attempt to provide type and memory safety
for C and C++ programs are fail-stop, aborting program
execution once detecting an error [6], [7], [8]. Valgrind [9] use
binary rewriting or emulation to dynamically detect memory
corruptions in unaltered programs. Diehard [10] is a runtime
system that can provide probabilistic memory safety. Fail-stop
means the user will loose all sensitive memory once memory
corruptions. However, memory corruptions detection are not
the only requirements for users. The importance is how to
response and protect the sensitive memory when there are
memory corruptions. Sensitive memory deletion is good to
avoid sensitive data leaking, however, in some sense, it is
not good for users when they don’t have any copies for the
sensitive data.
In this paper, we present an alternate approach to reducing
the impact of sensitive heap memory corruptions on C and
C++ programs without modifying source code information or
rewriting binary. Because most of sensitive data is in the heap.
So we focus on heap memory not stack. Our main contributions
are as follows:
• Selfie provide one flexible sensitive memory protec-
tion and recovery solution without modifying source
code and rewriting binary. Selfie provide one modified
memory allocator for C and C++ programs, which can
be loading in runtime according to users’ requirements
which memory should be sensitive.
• Selfie analyze the possible heap memory corruption
vulnerabilities. Selfie balance the pin tool to provide
a practical solution to detect the memory corruptions.
The importance is to figure out the root cause of the
memory corruptions. So Selfie provides data structure
extracting and dynamic program slicing to figure out
the root cause of the memory corruptions.
• Selfie provide one solution to decide whether execu-
tion needs to be recovered. If the memory corrup-
tion doesn’t belong sensitive memory, Selfie provides
symbolic solver that can help figure out whether the
memory corruption can affect the sensitive memory
in future. Finally, Selfie can do execution recovery
according to the above analysis.
II. HEAP MEMORY CORRUPTION
There are a lot of memory corruption vulnerabilities in
software. Heap memory corruption is very serious vulnerability
currently. Out there in the wild, many memory allocators are
available, such as dlmalloc, jemalloc, tcmalloc, malloc(glibc).
The whole of paper will base on glibc malloc heap memory
allocator. It will be easy to expand to other memory allocators.
Next, we will do simple introduction about glibc malloc
memory allocator. And then we talk about the current heap
memory corruptions.
A. Heap Memory Allocation
Each memory allocation is internally represented by
chunk. A chunk consists of metadata and the memory re-
turned to the program. All these chunks are saved on the heap,
which is a memory region capable of expanding when new
memory is requested. Similarly, the heap can shrink once a
certain amount of memory has been freed.
struct malloc_chunk {
INTERNAL_SIZE_T prev_size;
INTERNAL_SIZE_T size;
struct malloc_chunk* fd;
struct malloc_chunk* bk;
struct malloc_chunk* fd_nextsize;
struct malloc_chunk* bk_nextsize;
};
For allocated chunk in heap, the memory layout of the heap
is as follows:
• prev size: If the previous chunk is free, this field
contains the size of previous chunk. Else if previous
chunk is allocated, this field contains previous chunk’s
user data.
• size: This field contains the size of this allocated
chunk. Last 3 bits of this field contains flag infor-
mation.
◦ PREV INUSE(P): This bit is set when pre-
vious chunk is allocated.
◦ IS MMAPPED(M): This bit is set when
chunk is mmap’d.
◦ NON MAIN ARENA(N): This bit is set
when this chunk belongs to a thread arena.
B. Heap Memory Corruption Classification
For heap memory corruption, it will involve two regions
of memory, one source chunk and one or more target chunks.
Target chunks can include application data or heap meta-
data.The attacker’s goal is to overwrite some part of target
chunk with attacker-controlled data. However, this is not only
heap memory corruption. We do the deeper study about heap
memory exploitation in the following.
Inter-chunk heap overflow involves two regions of mem-
ory, and it can be the most common vulnerability class, writing
linearly off the end of a heap allocation. There was one very
famous case off-by-one heap overflow in glibc [11]. This case
can make heap end up in a deterministic state at the time of
the exploit attempt. However, far more common is where the
attacker is attacking a heap which is in a completely unknown
state, such as in the context of a remote service, a web browser
renderer process or a kernel.
Intra-chunk heap overflow [12] can provide a very
powerful exploitation primitive. This memory corruption does
not cross a heap chunk, and it just crosses the fields in the
data structure. In this attack, all of the uncertainty and non-
determinism arising from unknown heap state is eliminated.
The heap can be in any state, yet the same program data will
always be corrupted in the same way. Let us to see one code
sample as follows. This simple code shows us that intra-chunk
heap overflow is very powerful and reliable. And it is also very
difficult to detect this memory corruption.
struct goaty {char name[8]; int should_run_calc;};
int main(int argc, const char* argv[]){
struct goaty* g = malloc(sizeof(struct goaty));
g->should_run_calc = 0;
strcpy(g->name, "projectgoat");
if (g->should_run_calc) execl("/bin/gnome-calculator", 0);
}
Use-After-Free is a very serious and reliable exploit. The
reason is that their existence is a result of the combined actions
from different parts of an application namely, the parts of the
code that can cause the freeing of the object and the parts
of the code that use the object. Use-after-free heap memory
corruption requires a thorough code review to be identified
manually especially in complex and large codebases.
III. SELFIE OVERVIEW
Sensitive memory is different with critical memory [13]
which allows programmers to identify and protect data that is
critical to the correct execution of their application. In some
sense, the programmers can pre-define the sensitive memory.
However, different users may have different requirements for
sensitive memory. So it is better to define the sensitive memory
by users.
Selfie can allow users to choose the sensitive memory in
runtime. Whenever the users think about some content that
should be sensitive, they can tag the memory that should
be sensitive in the time window. When Selfie detects there
is one heap memory corruption, the first thing will be to
decide whether the memory corruption belongs to the sensitive
memory. If it is sensitive memory, we must do execution
recovery. If it is non-sensitive memory, we need firstly to figure
out whether the memory corruption will affect the sensitive
memory in future and then consider whether execution recov-
ery is necessary.
Figure 1 presents the high-level overview of Selfie and
details its five main components: (i) a modified memory al-
locator, (ii)dynamic instrumentation detection tool, (iii) a
root cause analyzer, (iv) a symbolic solver and (v) execution
recovery.
Selfie relies on a modified memory allocator to collect the
sensitive memory. If Selfie does LD PRELOAD for this mod-
ified memory allocator, it will replace the memory allocator in
the beginning. So the whole of memory will be sensitive. So
Selfie provides runtime libhijack feature which can make users
to define which memory will be sensitive in runtime. Dynamic
instrumentation tool will continue to check whether there
are memory corruptions. Once memory corruptions happen,
dynamic instrumentation tool will provide information whether
it belongs to sensitive memory or non-sensitive memory. If it is
non-sensitive memory, it doesn’t mean we don’t need consider
this memory corruption. We need to figure out whether it can
affect the sensitive memory by symbolic solver in future. If it
does affect or it is sensitive memory, the root cause analyzer
will figure out which data structure has been corrupted and
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Fig. 1: Overview of Selfie
which input make the memory corruption. Once Selfie figures
out the root cause, Selfie can locate the clean state and then
do execution recovery.
IV. USER-DEFINED SENSITIVE MEMORY
Developers can define the critical memory based on the
program logic. However, whether the memory is sensitive for
users, and it can be different according to different users’
requirements and different contexts. Let us think about one
very simple case - text editor ’geany’. Geany provides many
editor windows for different files at the same time. It is not
practical for developers to make all editor windows sensitive.
So the better solution is that the users can choose which editor
window should be sensitive or include sensitive memory for
users. Selfie provides one modified memory allocator to help
users to define which memory should be sensitive in one time
window and provide one tool to help user turn on/off the
sensitive memory option.
A. Modified Memory Allocator
Currently, Selfie focuses on glibc memory allocator(e.g.
malloc, calloc and realloc). Selfie’s goal is to avoid mem-
ory corruption for sensitive memory, and we don’t consider
whether the sensitive memory will leak. So we don’t provide
isolation or shadow memory for sensitive memory. We keep
the sensitive memory integrity and we don’t loose the sensitive
memory once memory corruption.
Selfie overrides the glibc memory allocator and adds land-
mark to the end of the allocated memory. Dynamic instrumen-
tation module can figure out whether the memory is sensitive
memory based on the post landmark. Especially, symbolic
solver needs to figure out whether there are illegal write to
sensitive memory.
B. Switch for Sensitive or Non-Sensitive
If users adopt the modified memory allocator in pre-load
section, the whole heap memory will be sensitive and users
cannot decide when to turn on/off the sensitive memory. So
Selfie can provide the runtime libhijack to override the glibc
memory allocator in runtime.
Selfie balances the libhijack to do good thing, change
modified memory allocator in runtime. We really don’t do code
injection. Instead, Selfie allocates a new memory mapping and
store auxiliary data in mapping,such as lib.so and name of the
fuction to hijack. Libhijack will call dlopen and dlsym and
replace GOT entry with entry found via dlsym. The key point
is about how to reimplement dlopen. The high level will be
load dependencies (deps can be loaded via real dlopen). And
then it can create memory map and write .so data to new
memory maps. Patch into the RTLD and run init routines can
be the best way to figure out the address of GOT. Hijack GOT
is the best way to override the memory allocator. Once the
users want to disable the sensitive memory, Selfie just load
the normal memory allocator.
V. ROOT CAUSE FOR HEAP MEMORY CORRUPTION
It is always a challenge task to figure out the root cause
for memory corruption. Especially, it is expensive to collect
and store dynamic traces which may be needed to locate the
memory corruption. Fine-grained tracing is needed so that the
fault can be later analyzed and the root cause of the memory
corruption can be detected. However, it is far more practical.
Selfie integrates online dynamic and offline static analysis to
figure out the root cause of memory corruption.
A. Heap Memory Corruption Detection
There has been many solutions [14], [15], [16] about how
to detect the heap memory corruption. Selfie adopts dynamic
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instrumentation tool to detect the heap memory corruption dy-
namically. Selfie will maintain two lists for memory allocation,
one is sensitive memory allocation list and another one is non-
sensitive memory allocation. Meanwhile, Selfie also maintains
one free list. When application allocates an area in the heap,
generally the memory allocator sets headers before the memory
area (checking Section II-A). These headers can contain some
information like size, used or not etc.. Basically, when Selfie
monitor the allocator, it can determine the base address and
the size of the allocation areas. When Selfie check all STORE
and LOAD accesses in memory, it can determine which one is
outside the two maintained memory allocation lists. For use-
after-free, Selfie can easily check the free list to make sure
whether the memory has been freed.
In Section II-B, we have mentioned two very interesting
heap overflow: inter-chunk heap overflow and intra-chunk heap
overflow. It is every easy to detect inter-chunk heap overflow
based on the above solution. However, intra-chunk heap over-
flow is not easy to detect. The problem is that when Selfie
records all memory allocation. The semantic information of
memory has been discarded. Selfie just can maintain the base
address and size of the memory allocation. But it cannot figure
out the intra-chunk information. Semantic missing will directly
miss the memory corruption. Even for [17], [18], they places
canaries between chunks in the heap, but that too focuses on
inter-chunk overflows rather than intra-chunk overflows. So
intra-chunk heap overflow is still very serious problem. How
to maintain the data structure semantic information in runtime
will be still a promising direction. Based on the data structure
information, field slicing (such as some data structure filed
work [19]) may be one direction to figure out the intra-chunk
heap overflow.
B. Symbolic Solver
For the long running program, memory corruptions can
introduce huge damage, but not all memory corruptions and
some memory corruptions may be no any effect for the whole
execution. The users only care about the correct execution and
sensitive memory. If some memory corruptions don’t affect the
execution and sensitive memory, it is very expense to deal with
them. Selfie use the concolic execution which is a technic that
uses both symbolic and concrete execution to solve a constraint
path. The concolic execution is mainly used to cover the effect
of memory corruption in future.
C. Corrupted Data Structure Extract
When Selfie detect the heap memory corruption, it will
report which instruction make the memory corruption. We
assume the application with debug information. So it will
be easy to figure out the the line number corresponding
with source code. How to automatically figure out the data
structure name and definition according to line number? Selfie
builds one clang plugin to automatically figure out the related
data structure information. It can provide Selfie with the
name of allocated data structures. To mark individual memory
addresses with their fine-grained data types, Selfie needs to
extract definitions of data structures from source codes. Selfie
uses the Clang compiler front-end [20] to parse the source
files and generate the corresponding abstract syntax trees.
Selfie’s plugins uses LibClang and LibTooling libraries to
recursively traverse the generated syntax trees and extract
data structure definitions automatically. Direct parsing of the
individual source codes independently is not straightforward,
because the sources contain several interdependencies such as
header file inclusions as well as source-defined macros that
need to be resolved before the parsing. Correct resolution of
source file interdependencies is crucial for Selfie’s accuracy,
because we faced many different data structures with identical
names defined in different unrelated files within the source
code. Selfie employs Bear [21] to create a Clang JSON
compilation database. Selfie extracts and captures all inter-file
dependencies and resolves the macros. Consequently, Selfie
uses the compilation database to parse correct source files for
data structure definitions when the definitions do not reside in
the same file where the structures are used.
D. Dynamic Slicing
Data structure information let us know which data structure
meets memory corruption. However, we still don’t know which
input or which step introduces the memory corruption. If we
cannot figure out this problem, it will be very difficult to locate
the clean state and do execution recovery. It is impossible to
analysis each instructions from the beginning. It is better that
we can just analyze the related instruction. Selfie uses program
slice which contains all statements in a program that directly or
indirectly affect the value of a variable or instruction. We can
further narrow down the notion of the slice to dynamic program
slice [22]. Unlike traditional slicing named static slicing which
computes all statements that may have affected the value of a
variable at a program point for any arbitrary execution of the
program, the dynamic program slicing computes all statements
that actually affect the value of a variable/instruction at a
program point for a particular execution of the program with
given input.
Selfie uses the dynamic program slicing to narrow down
the analysis range. The lastest input instruction will be very
possible reason for heap memory corruption. Once Selfie
recognizes the root cause of memory corruption, Selfie can
report where is the clean state, so it can make execution
recovery from this clean state and avoid the bad input. Finally,
Selfie benefits online dynamic and offline static analysis to
do execution recovery not just exit and loose the sensitive
memory.
VI. EXECUTION RECOVERY
Memory checkpointing and recovery [23], [24], [25] has
been very widely to improve the reliability of today’s software
stack. Because it is an important technique that allows users
to snapshot the memory image of a running program in main
memory and restore the checkpointed image later on. Most
application scenarios require high checkpointing frequencies.
For example, automatic error recovery techniques typically
checkpoint the active memory image at every client request
or at carefully selected rescue points, commonly resulting in
thousands of checkpoints per second. Selfie takes snapshot
based on function level. During the execution, it is possible
for Selfie to take a snapshot of the registers and memory
states in the entry of each function. Then, at each program
point, it is possible to restore the previous snapshot. We don’t
means keep all the snapshot, because it will be very expense
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for memory. Though we do function level snapshot, we don’t
keep all the snapshots. We only focus on source code defined
functions. Meanwhile, we analyze the function call graph and
choose which function snapshot should be kept following the
time window. Figure 3 shows one example about function
call graph. We can see main function is the entry, and there are
many different exit points. From each entry to exit, it is as one
function call path. We keep each path differently. Based on the
different paths, we choose whether some function snapshots
should be kept.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION
Selfie architecture, as presented in Figure 1, has been im-
plemented on Linux v3.13 for x86 64 Ubuntu 14.04 machine
without ASLR. Selfie integrates and modifies current research
tools and develops new tools to finish final goal. Runtime
libhijack is to balance libhijack [26] which has good support
for FreeBSD but not for Ubuntu. I modify the code to make
it work well on Ubuntu to load library by dlopen runtime.
I modify glibc memory allocator (malloc, calloc and realloc)
to add landmark information to override the normal memory
allocator for sensitive memory.
Dynamic instrumentation tool is very useful for detect-
ing heap memory corruption. In the beginning, I choose to
use PIN [27] to do dynamic instrumentation. Later, I found
out another tools Triton [28] which is a Pin-based dynamic
symbolic execution (DSE) framework. Although Triton is a
DSE framework, it also provides internal components like
a taint engine, a snapshot engine, translation of x86 and
x86-64 instructions into SMT2-LIB, a Z3 interface to solve
constraints and, the last but not least, Python bindings. Based
on Triton, Selfie build its own program analysis tool to finish
memory corruption detection, symbolic solver and execution
recovery. For recording sensitive memory tracing, we build the
Read/Write memory tracer based on Triton. So we can know
which instruction read or write the sensitive memory. However,
runtime tracing based on PIN has super high performance
overhead. As one option, I do offline analysis based on
IDA Pro. Because we assume without ASLR (it is not good
assumption). Selfie use one IDA Pro script to record all heap
memory access across an executable using IDA debugger API.
So Selfie can build the profile about heap memory access.
Root cause analyzer includes data structure analysis and
related instructions analysis. It belongs offline analysis. In
Section V-C, we have mentioned that Selfie develop one
Clang Libtooling plugin to figure out data structure definition.
Before data structure analysis, we firstly use gdb to figure out
the line number of error instruction. About dynamic slicing,
Selfie balances the Giri [29] which handles both data-flow
and control-flow dependences when computing the dynamic
backwards slice. Giri takes advantage of the LLVM intermedi-
ate representation(IR), which is static single assignment (SSA)
form, to reduce the size of the trace file.
Our current Selfie prototype’s detection and recovery is
based on Triton dynamic symbolic framework. So it inherit
the limitation of Triton.
VIII. EVALUATION
We evaluated Selfie on Intel i7-4710MQ CPU 2.50GHz
and 16 GB of RAM. We ran all our tests on an Ubuntu 14.04
Fig. 2: Selfie works well on simple off-by-one heap overflow
Linux kernel 3.13. We designed a set of experiments to verify
whether Selfie can be useful in real-world practical scenarios.
We firstly go through one simple code example and then target
the real-world application.
A. Case study: off-by-one heap overflow
Let us firstly focus on one very simple off-by-one heap
overflow, and how Selfie detect the heap overflow and finish
the execution recovery. In the following sample, it can have
off-by-on heap overflow when n ¿= BUFF MAX.
#define BUFF_MAX 128
int main(int ac, const char *av[])
{
char *buff1, *buff2;
int i;
buff1 = (char*)malloc(BUFF_MAX);
buff2 = (char*)malloc(BUFF_MAX);
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
if (!buff1 || !buff2)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) /* off-by-one */
buff1[i] = ’A’;
for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) /* off-by-one */
buff2[i] = ’B’;
free(buff1);
free(buff2);
return 0;
}
Figure 2 shows that Selfie works well on this simple off-
by-one heap overflow. The first time, we set the n value is
128. We can see there are heap overflow and Selfie recognizes
the 128 is bad input. So Selfie requests the user to do second
time input. When the user input 56 which is n’s value. Now,
there isn’t any error. Selfie evaluates the input is good input.
We can see that Selfie perfectly detects the heap overflow and
then finishes execution recovery. There is many intermediate
result about gdb recognizing line number, AST Tree Based on
clang libtooling, data structure extracting and dynamic slicing,
you can check code package.
B. Case study: NullHttpd
Null httpd is a very small, simple and multithreaded web
server for Linux and Windows, Which contains a remote
exploitable heap overflow [30], when negative Content-Length
values are transmitted. Next, we will show how Selfie detect
the heap overflow. In this case study, we will analyze the heap
overflow from memory aspect.
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In the following, it shows us three pieces of memory dump.
In the first piece, it is very easy for us to locate ”ef ef ef ef fe
fe fe fe” which is the landmark to tag the sensitive memory. In
the third line, we can find hex sequences ”10 67 42 b7” which
is the size of calloc(2200). In Section II-A, we have illustrated
the metadata about memory allocation. ”10 67 42 b7” is the
size of allocated memory, and next it will be the allocated
memory. The second piece of memory dump show us the heap
overflow location. We can check http.c file in line 100. If we
just analyze the source code, the size of calloc should be more
than 1024, however, the allocated size just 224. So if the buffer
is larger than 224, there will be heap overflow. So the reason
may locate in ContentLength. Because in ContentLength is
the filed of conn[sid].dat (data structure analysis gives us
more information about this data structure), If we find out
the conn[sid].dat heap location, we can figure out the value of
in ContentLength. In third piece of memory dump, we find
out the location of conn[sid].dat. And then we figure out the
address of in ContentLength which is 0xfffffce0, and the value
is -800. So that means there is negative length. However, the
negative length is not valid length. So negative length results
in heap overflow.
sever.c
462: conn=calloc(config.server_maxconn, sizeof(CONNECTION));
calloc(2200) = 0x9792810
00000810 40 eb 75 b7 40 eb 75 b7 04 00 00 00 02 00 c1 22 |@.u.@.u........"|
00000820 7f 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2b 47 46 56 |............+GFV|
00000830 2b 47 46 56 10 67 42 b7 68 04 40 b7 40 fb 57 b7 |+GFV.gB.h.@.@.W.|
00000840 40 fb 57 b7 05 00 00 00 02 00 c1 23 7f 00 00 01 |@.W........#....|
00000850 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2f 47 46 56 2f 47 46 56 |......../GFV/GFV|
00000860 00 00 00 00 68 04 20 b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |....h. .........|
00000870 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
000010a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ef ef ef ef fe fe fe fe |................|
000010b0 a4 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
heap overflow location:
http.c
100: conn[sid].PostData=calloc(conn[sid].dat->in_ContentLength+1024, sizeof(char));
calloc(224) = 0xb7426710
00026710 0a eb 0a 2d 2d 6e 65 74 72 69 63 2d 2d 31 c0 31 |...--netric--1.1|
00026720 db 31 c9 31 d2 b0 66 b3 01 51 b1 06 51 b1 01 51 |.1.1..f..Q..Q..Q|
00026730 b1 02 51 8d 0c 24 cd 80 b3 02 b1 02 31 c9 51 51 |..Q..$......1.QQ|
00026740 51 80 c1 77 66 51 b1 02 66 51 8d 0c 24 b2 10 52 |Q..wfQ..fQ..$..R|
00026750 51 50 8d 0c 24 89 c2 31 c0 b0 66 cd 80 b3 01 53 |QP..$..1..f....S|
00026760 52 8d 0c 24 31 c0 b0 66 80 c3 03 cd 80 31 c0 50 |R..$1..f.....1.P|
00026770 50 52 8d 0c 24 b3 05 b0 66 cd 80 89 c3 31 c9 31 |PR..$...f....1.1|
00026780 c0 b0 3f cd 80 41 31 c0 b0 3f cd 80 41 31 c0 b0 |..?..A1..?..A1..|
00026790 3f cd 80 31 db 53 68 6e 2f 73 68 68 2f 2f 62 69 |?..1.Shn/shh//bi|
000267a0 89 e3 8d 54 24 08 31 c9 51 53 8d 0c 24 31 c0 b0 |...T$.1.QS..$1..|
000267b0 0b cd 80 31 c0 b0 01 cd 80 bf ff b0 ef bf ff b0 |...1............|
000267c0 ef bf ff b0 ef bf ff b0 ef bf ff b0 ef bf ff b0 |................|
*
00026870 ef bf ff b0 ef bf ff b0 ff ff ff ff fc ff ff ff |................|
00026880 ef 34 f3 04 08 d1 fb 04 08 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.4..............|
00026890 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
00047000
the reason: negative length
server.c
516 conn[sid].dat=calloc(1, sizeof(CONNDATA));
calloc(78160) = 0xb7400468
0xfffffce0 = -800
00000460 00 00 00 00 ad 62 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.....b..........|
00000470 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 fc ff ff 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000480 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
000009f0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 54 54 50 |............HTTP|
00000a00 2f 31 2e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |/1.0............|
00000a10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
00000e80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 31 32 37 2e |............127.|
00000e90 30 2e 30 2e 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |0.0.1...........|
00000ea0 50 4f 53 54 00 00 00 00 2f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |POST..../.......|
00000eb0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
000013c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff |................|
000013d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
*
000135b0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ef ef ef ef fe fe fe fe |................|
000135c0 5c 31 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |\1..............|
IX. RELATED WORK
This section provides a general overview of existing mem-
ory protection and recovery techniques. We focus here on user-
level memory protection and recovery.
A. Checkpointing
Memory Checkpointing is a pivotal technique in systems
reliability, with applications ranging from crash recovery to
replay debugging. There are different checkpointing solu-
tions like fork-based checkpointing [23], [24], [25], Mprotect-
based checkpointing [31], [32], Soft Dirty Bit-based Check-
pointing [33] and undolog-based checkpointing [34], [35],
[13]. These memory checkpointing solutions require high-
frequency checkpoints. So they incur either substantial runtime
performance overhead, or poor memory usage guarantees.
Though [13] proposes one lightweight memory checkpoint-
ing which combines low performance overhead with strong
memory usage guarantees for high checkpointing frequencies.
However, from users’ aspect, they only care about their sensi-
tive memory which defined by themselves. For example, users
just want to protect and recover sensitive memory data in
one important tab in Chrome or Firefox browser, and they
don’t care about other tab’s memory. We provide one feasible
solution for users who want to protect and recover self-defined
sensitive memory. There is no doubt that our solution can
reduce the runtime performance overhead and memory space.
B. Error Tolerance
DieHard [10] is a memory allocator that hardens the appli-
cation to memory errors. It can provide probabilistic soundess
guarantees for applications that allow them to continue execu-
tioin in thee presence of memory errors. DieHard provides one
replicated mode, which means the whole process is replicated.
The replicated process still will incur performance overhead
and is not feasible for users. Samurai [36] adopts critical
memory concept and only replicates critical memory. Though
it can provide strong protection guarantees for the application,
it needs programmer effort and the critical memory generally
is not sensitive memory for users.
C. Memory Tracing and Watchpoints
Memory tracing allows the execution of memlets for each
memory access. MemTrace [37] provides dynamic lightweight
memory tracing for unmodified binary applications. MemTrace
adds shadow memory and state for each memory address
of an application and allows the execution of user-defined
memlets to inspect memory accesses. The serious problem
is that MemTrace [37] uses cross-ISA translation for 32-bit
applications to a 64-bit ISA to offer both a wider address space
and additional register to user-defined memlets. So MemTrace
cannot work for 64-bit applications. Metric [38] is a memory
tracing framework that collects and stores selected memory
access traces. Metric extracts access traces based on dynamic
binary rewriting of the execution application. [39] proposes
one general framework hwo to analyze and trace memory and
understand the memory layout. [40] provides one hardware-
based memory meta data protection solution. Our solution,
Selfie, just need dynamic load or unload our memory allocation
lib for user-defined sensitive memory.
6
D. Taint Tracking and Data Flow analysis
Taint tracking and data flow analysis extend memory
tracing and analysis the flow of data inside an application.
Every memory cell and every register has an associated tag.
TaintCheck [41] propose dynamic taint analysis for automatic
detection of overwrite attacks, which include most types of
exploits. TaintCheck doesn’t need source code or special com-
pilation for the monitored program. DataFlowSanitizer [42] is
a generalised dynamic data flow analysis. Though TaintCheck
doesn’t need source code, it incur high runtime overhead.
DataFlowSanitizer need source code and compiler extension to
add tag information in the code. They track the whole memory
while the users may just interest in sensitive memory.
E. Binary Translation
Binary translation is to instrument a binary application. For
example, IR-based binary translators translate the application
by using a traditional compiler approach. It can add the
desired instrumentation and generates machine code for the
desired instrumentation, such as DynamoRIO [43], PIN [27],
QEMU [44], and Valgrind [9]. Instrumentation will incur more
performance overhead. Meanwhile, it is no easy for user to
choose user-defined sensitive memory. Selfie can provide much
more feasible for users.
F. Memory Analysis and Recovery
Reviver [45] proposes one memory data structure instance
recovery framework to analyze the memory layout. [46] makes
one memory data attack once learning about the memory
layout. Dscrete [47] provides memory rendering through reuse
of application logic to reverse engineer a memory image for
more semantic information. Dscrete heavily relies on exact
identification of the so-called P function within the binary that
takes as input the target data structure instance and produce
the human readable application output. Dscrete tries to figure
out which memory is useful and to recover. However, Selfie
can provide the user-defined sensitive memory and narrow the
range of recovery.
X. CONCLUSION
Different users always have different requirement for sen-
sitive memory definition. It is not flexible for aborting program
execution once detecting memory corruption. Because the
users may loose some sensitive data. We presented Selfie, a
hybird solution to provide one flexible solution to protect the
sensitive memory according to users’ requirements in runtime.
In addition, Selfie provides one comprehensive solution to
detect the heap memory corruptions and figure out the root
cause of memory corruption by data structure extracting and
dynamic program slicing. Further, Selfie will decide whether
the execution recovery is necessary.
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